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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950262-CA

vs.
KAN TING FUNG,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPOINTED
AN INTERPRETER TO WHOM FUNG OBJECTED, BECAUSE IT FAILED
TO PROPERLY APPLY THE CONTROLLING STATUTE IN A SITUATION
WHERE THE STATUTE WAS THE ONLY METHOD TO ASSURE THAT THE
INTERPRETER WAS EFFECTIVE.
A.

Rule 3-306 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration
must be rigorously applied.

When a language translated at trial is rare, or especially
unfamiliar to a particular location, there is little likelihood
that anyone hearing the public proceedings could ever recognize
errors in the translation.

A similar but more acute problem

exists when translation is whispered only at the defendant's
table, such as when a criminal defendant exercises her
constitutional right not to testify.

In at least the latter, and

perhaps often in both situations, the translation is not
preserved in the record for appeal. As a result, there is simply
no practical way to determine whether errors in translation in
fact prejudiced the defendant, and accordingly, there can be no
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meaningful review of the same.
Moreover, if prejudicial errors in fact occur in
translation, whether through honest mistake or on account of some
concealed or otherwise unknown bias of the interpreter, not only
is it not preserved in the record for appeal, but also, neither
the defendant nor his counsel--nor possibly even the interpreter
himself--would know it at the time, or ever.

It is indeed

possible for a mean-spirited translator to intentionally
mistranslate proceedings in order to further some personal
prejudice, albeit at public trial, and no one in all the world
would be the wiser.

The potential for such abuse must

necessarily be minimized in courts of justice.
This reflects the situation in the present case.

As the

trial court noted, Cantonese is not a common language and rarely
is translated in the courts (R. 128). At trial, Fung exercised
his Constitutional right not to testify.

The translation which

took place to provide Fung an understanding of the proceedings
was not made part of the record.

Kim-Fai Chan's actual

interpreting performance is in no way reflected in the record
(R.).

Fung is left merely with the protection which the statute

provided at the interpreter selection stage.
If a poor translation left Fung with an inadequate
understanding of the proceedings, he would not have been able to
effectively counsel with his attorney during the trial.
Therefore, if Fung's right to understand the proceedings was not
adequately protected at the interpreter selection stage, he may
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have been prejudiced in fact, and no one in all the world would
be the wiser.

It is impossible for this court to provide a

meaningful review of whether errors in translation actually
prejudiced Fung.

Therefore, this court should seek to provide

other available safeguards against the potential for the gross
injustice which may have prejudiced Fung.
The dilemma presented by a rare language, and accentuated
when the translation is not on record can be moderated by a
meaningful review of the trial court's application of Rule 3-306
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (1992 as amended)
(hereinafter Rule 3-306).

It is the best, and perhaps the only

means available for this court to provide some protection against
the type of unknowable prejudice presented here.

Accordingly,

Fung urges this Court to hold that any application of Rule 3-306
must be rigorous when the language of translation is rare, or
when the translation will not be made part of the record.
Failure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial in this
way should be held to constitute an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.
Though such a holding will not entirely resolve the dilemma,
it will approach a more adequate protection for Fung, and greatly
improve the appearance of fairness at trial. Whenever the
language is rare or the translation is not made part of the
record, allowing broad discretion in the application of Rule 3306 does not provide healthy flexibility to the trial court,
instead it maximizes the potential for mistake or abuse by the
3

interpreter.
B.

In this case Rule 3-306 was not applied.

It is extremely unlikely that the trial court was able to
rigorously, or alternatively, otherwise properly apply Rule 3-306
when it failed to even recognize its existence.

In fact, the

trial court stated, "until, in the State of Utah we have any
standards or establish standards regarding court interpreters,
then it's within the sound discretion of the court to make
inquiry on the record regarding one's background or skills" (R.
128) .
Looking to Rule 3-306 itself, there are two alternative
procedures for appointing interpreters.

Neither was followed

properly, let alone rigorously, in this case.

When a court

appoints an interpreter Rule 3-3 06 requires that the court
ascertain that the interpreter meets three requirements (Rule 3306(1)(B)).

The statute itself emphasizes that these are

"minimum" requirements by explicit language (Id.).1
Each of the three statutorily mandated criteria focuses on
abilities of the interpreter with respect to "terms used in court
proceedings" (Rule 3-306 (1) (A) (i-iii)) . Before appointing Chan
1

The other procedure involves appointing interpreters from a
list of certified interpreters created by the administrative
office. The court did not choose this procedure. While Rule 3-306
directs the administrative office to establish its own criteria for
certification of interpreters, it requires that the office at very
least "shall include" the three requirements found in Rule 3306 (1) (A) (i-iii) . The court is similarly bound to require those
three minimum criteria, and presumably, similarly capable to
require more criteria or higher standards, but not fewer criteria
or lower standards (Rule 3-306(1) (B).
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as interpreter, the Court was statutorily compelled to require
that Chan 1) understand these terms, 2) have the ability to
explain their meaning in English and Cantonese, and 3) have the
ability to translate them from English to Cantonese (Id.).
The record shows the trial court's clear deficiency in
applying Rule 3-306:
The court: Next question is, I'm given to
understand that you may not have had --or you may have
had very limited contact with the court system; is that
correct?
The interpreter: I understand court system, but
some of the terms, direct Cantonese translation, I may
not understand2 (R. 126-27).
This was the court's only inquiry even close to the criteria
required by Rule 3-306.

Chan's response suggests that he fails

all three statutory requirements.

Chan's admission that he does

not understand some terms also means that he cannot meet the
remaining two requirements either.
Additionally, although no translation is part of the record,
Chan's dialogue with Judge Davis in Chambers does suggest
considerable weakness on the part of the interpreter.

Chan

initially responded to the question of his native language as
"Hong Kong," before correcting himself (R. 124). Chan also made
a linguistic error (similar to errors apparent in the indented
except cited above) when he told the court, "my second language
is Mandarin, and third one is English" (R. 124). These errors
were made in twenty-five short lines of speech from the record.
2

Another line of inquiry by the court determined that Kim-Fai
Chan had no experience interpreting in court at any level (R. 127) .
5

Obviously there was much greater opportunity for error during the
trial itself.
The State agrees that the "most competent and least biased"
person should be appointed interpreter, following the Kiev v.
Abell, 483 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App. 1972), opinion.
at 5.

Br. of Appellee

However, the State overstates its criticism of Fung's

omission of the word "available" in his reference to the Kiev
opinion in Appellant's brief. Id.

First, that an interpreter

must be available in order to be appointed goes without saying,
so that the condition of "availability" in Kley, without
elaboration, adds nothing, and may be dictum.

Kiev, 483 S.W.2d

at 628.
Second, in the Kley case the plaintiff was a deaf mute who
sued for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident.

The deaf mute communicated only through grunts,

gestures and motions which his brother understood, because it was
a language of their own that they created when growing up.

Kiev,

483 S.W.2d at 628. Thus, the brother was the most competent and
least biased interpreter "available," because he was the only
competent translator.

Id.

If not mere dictum, then Kley at most

suggests only that a competent translator exist in order to be
"available."

The real concern of the court in Kiev was that the

most competent and least biased interpreter be appointed, as also
evidenced by the fact that this black letter rule followed the
following statement:
An interpreter who functions with the sanction of the
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court necessarily enjoys a preferred position,
especially where, as here, his interpretations are not
subject to refutation.
Kiev, 483 S.W.2d at 628.
Finally, the State argues that the word "available" is an
important part of the Kiev holding, and is only dropped in State
v. Givens, 719 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. App. 1986), case because it was not
an issue in the Givens case.

Br. of Appellee at 6.

Though

availability was not an issue in Givens, the reason the State
gives for the omission of the word "available" is nevertheless
purely speculative.

It is equally possible that the court in

Givens found the word "available" from Kley to be unnecessary
dictum.
The State also cites Hooks v. State, 534 So.2d 329 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1987), as an example of courts appointing "persons far
more likely to be biased due to their positions." Br. of Appellee
at 6.

In Hooks, however, the court was applying different law.

The opinion states that "the law in Alabama does not require that
an interpreter be the 'least interested person available,'" and
then refers to numerous cases when relatives or work-related
interpreters were allowed.

Hooks, 534 So.2d at 356.

Commonwealth v. Carillo, 465 A.2d 1256 (Pa. Super. 1983),
cited by the State for the same proposition, is also easily
distinguished from the case at Bar.

Br. of Appellee at 6.

Carillo held that only that the assignment of a police officer
did not presumptively

prejudice criminal defendant.

A.2d at 1264 (emphasis added).

The following excerpt
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Carillo, 465

demonstrates that the reasoning which the Carillo court employed
does not apply to Fung as the State suggests:
Therefore, because of the preceding [that
qualification of interpreters does not reach
constitutional proportions] and the safeguards already
afforded an accused by our judicial system in the form
of pre-trial, post-trial and appellate review, we
refuse appellant's invitation to adopt a per se rule
that there is an inherent bias, and a violation of due
process rights, whenever a police officer is called
upon to serve as a defendant's interpreter at an
interrogation. Rather, we are of the mind that a
contention that an interpreter was biased, prejudiced
or unfair toward the affected non-English-speaking
defendant must be borne out by the record.
Carillo, 465 A.2d at 1264. This holding does not fit the case at
Bar because the safeguards referred to in the opinion do not
protect Fung in the special circumstances of this case as they
protected the defendant in Carillo.
Furthermore, the Carillo court was of the opinion that a per
se rule such as the defendant there requested would impose the
impossible requirement that all police forces in Pennsylvania,
regardless of size, employ an interpreter for all non-English
speaking persons subject to interrogation.
requests no such per

Id. at n. 4.

Fung

se rule, and there is no corresponding

concern for unreasonable cost, as no new state employees are
necessary to assure the proper application of a standard which
Fung asserts is already statutorily mandated.
CONCLUSION
Fung urges this Court to hold that any application of Rule
3-306 must be rigorous when the language of translation is rare,
or when the translation will not be made part of the record.
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Failure to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial in this
way should be held to constitute an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.

Because the trial court abused its discretion by

not rigorously or otherwise properly applying Rule 3-306 when
there was no other protection available to the defendant, this
Court should vacate Fung's conviction and remand the case for a
new trial.
DATED this

J

day of October, 1995.
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